The Bankruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdom is Deeper than Semantics: A Rejoinder to Professors Kaplan and Warren by Strnad, Jeff
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
THE BANKRUPTCY OF CONVENTIONAL TAX TIMING WISDOM IS DEEPER THAN SEMANTICS: 
A REJOINDER TO PROFESSORS KAPLAN AND WARREN 
Jeff Strnad 
Stanf o�c!__l,_aw Review, 
Januarv 1937 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 599 
March 1986 
ABSTRACT 
The Haig-Simons ideal is an important normative concept. But 
using it requires that one specify a method of measuring the value 
of changes in wealth. I use market value and present value, the 
concepts of value employed in modern finance theory. Professors 
Kaplow.and Warren disagree with a result that I show follows from 
those concepts of value: That the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons 
ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting. But their critique is 
ineffective because they do not present an alternative concept of 
value and give reasons for using it in the definition of the Haig­
Simons ideal instead of market value or present value. It is 
questionable whether such an alternative concept can be constructed 
that is also consistent with the idea of value contained in modern 
finance theory. 
Professors Kaplow and Warren generally agree with my position 
that it is important to take general equilibrium effects into 
account in assessing alternative tax policies. But their attempt 
to make a general equilibrium argument for the equivalence of the 
CFIT and yield exemption fails. In fact, using their approach 
reinforces the conclusion in my original article that the 
equivalence holds in a non-general-equilibrium setting only for 
breakeven transactions. 
The Bankruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdom is Deeper Than 
Semantics: A Rejoinder to Professors Kaplow and Warren 
by Jeff Strnad* 
My original article made two major points. First , it showed 
that a cash flow income tax ( "CFIT" ) rather than what I call the 
"traditional income tax" implements the Haig-Simons ideal in a non­
general-equilibrium setting. The Haig-Simons ideal requires that 
the tax base be consumption plus the change in net wealth in each 
accounting period. By "traditional income tax , "  I mean a tax that 
requires "economic depreciation" treatment of investment costs as 
opposed to the cash flow treatment of the CFIT. Since the 
conventional wisdom is that the traditional income tax best 
implements the Haig-Simons ideal , my conclusion , if accepted , would 
require Haig-Simons advocates to favor the CFIT in a non-general-
equilibrium setting. 
Second , I made the methodological claim that much tax policy 
analysis is incorrectly transactional in nature, in that it focuses 
on transactions rather than people and does not adequately consider 
the effect of various tax regimes on prices such as interest rates . 
Tax regimes often do have major impacts on prices , and particular 
transactions usually are not accurate proxies for particular 
individuals in both the tax and no tax worlds. As a result,  
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transactional analysis should be rejected wherever possible in 
favor of a general equilibrium analysis that focuses directly on 
the impact of the tax system on people. General equilibrium 
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analysis does attempt to consider the actual economic effects of 
changes in the tax laws. Results derived in a non-general­
equilibrium setting , including my own linking the CFIT to the Haig-
Simons ideal , deserve to be treated with caution . 
Professors Kaplow and Warren respond to both of my major 
conclusions. First , they disagree with the result that the CFIT 
rather than the traditional income tax implements the Haig-Simons 
ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting. In section I of this 
rejoinder I show that the claims on which their disagreement is 
based are groundless. Much of our debate on this issue follows 
from a simple fact : Because the Haig-Simons ideal requires changes 
in net wealth to be taxed, the analyst must specify the value of 
such changes. Professors Kaplow and Warren claim that my results 
follow tautologically from my use of the modern finance theory 
concept of present value as a measuring rod. But they do not make 
or cite a viable argument for an alternative measure of value . 
Second , Professors Kaplow and Warren agree with me that a 
general equilibrium analysis focusing on individuals is preferable 
to transactional analysis, but they quarrel with several points in 
my original article. I address each of their points in section II. 
Their most important argument consists of an example that they 
claim illustrates the equivalence of the CFIT with "yield 
exemption , " exclusion of investment and borrowing transactions from 
taxation. But , as I show below, careful examination of their 
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example strongly reinforces the conclusions in my original article 
that the CFIT and yield exemption generally are not equivalent . 
In summary, the response by Professors Kaplow and Warren does 
not seriously challenge any of the major conclusions in my original 
article .  
I .  The CFIT and the Haig-Simons Ideal 
The portion of my article analyzing various tax treatments 
using the Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting 
proceeds in three logical steps . l Step ( i )  is to set out the Haig­
Simons ideal as conventionally defined . That conventional 
definition includes changes in the "value" of wealth holdings in 
the tax base . As step ( ii ) ,  I choose to use after-tax present 
value in the tax world and present value in the no tax world as the 
relevant concepts of value . step ( iii)  is a showing that with the 
conventional definition of the Haig-Simons ideal and present value 
as the concept of "value, " the CFIT rather than the traditional 
income tax implements that ideal in a non-general-equilibrium 
setting . 
There is no difference of opinion between myself and 
Professors Kaplow and Warren on step ( i ) ,  the statement of the 
Haig-Simons ideal .  Both my article and their response cite the 
conventional formulations: 
1 .  There are many potent criticisms of the Haig-Simons ideal
and of the use of tax base ideals in general . For a good summary 
of some of these criticisms see R .  TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE : A 
NORMATIVE APPROACH 267-274 {1981) . It is not my intention to 
defend or attack the Haig-Simons ideal or tax base ideals in 
general . My goal is to show that the Haig-Simons ideal does not 
imply the tax treatments of investment and borrowing transactions 
usually associated with it . 
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" Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of
( 1 )  the market value of rights exercised in consumption and 
( 2 )  the change in the value of the store of property rights 
between the beginning and the end of the period in 
question . 11 2 {Henry Simons ) 
"Income is the money value of the net accretion to one's
economic power between two points in time . 113 {R-:>bert Haig) 
Neither of these definitions is self-executing . At least two 
additional specifications must be made in order to apply them. 
First, one must have a way of measuring after-tax results in a 
world with taxes . Second, one must choose a baseline measure to 
assess the after-tax results . In each case, the concept of "value" 
in the definitions must be clarified . Step ( ii )  in my article is 
to use present value to define both the after-tax results and the 
baseline . 
Professors Kaplow and Warren do not quarrel with step ( iii)  in 
my article, the showing that in a non-general-equilibrium setting 
the CFIT rather than the traditional income tax implements the 
Haig-Simons ideal given that present value is used to measure 
after-tax results and to establish a baseline in the no tax world. 
Indeed, they find this part of the analysis "simply a tautology . 114 
This is a strange criticism .  All good analysis is tautological in 
the sense that its conclusions are implied by its premises . The 
trick or skill is to see what particular premises ( such as the 
conventional statement of the Haig-Simons ideal ) do imply. This 
2 .  H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 225 {1938) . 
3 .  Haig, The Concept of Income -- Economic and Legal Aspects, 
in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (R .  Haig ed . 1921) . 
4. Kaplow and warren, An Income Tax by any Other Name A 
Reply to Professor Strnad, 38 STAN . LAW REV . 3 99, 400 ( 1986 ) 
(hereinafter cited as "Reply" ) . 
task occupied much of my article and occupies much of any 
thoughtful tax policy analysis . 
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Professors Kaplow and Warren do have a real criticism, 
however . This involves my step (ii) , the choice of present value 
to measure after-tax results and the no tax world baseline . They 
make two kinds of arguments against this approach . The first kind 
are analytic in nature . In a footnote, they quote the definition 
from Robert Haig set out above and suggest that perhaps the problem 
is that "money value" and not "present value" is the proper 
concept . 5 Presumably, "money value" in that definition refers to 
"market value . "  Their main argument in text compares my analysis 
at the instant after investment occurs to what happens over the 
entire life of an investment,6 This amounts to comparing my 
analysis for an accounting period consisting of the instant after 
investment to the result for a longer accounting period . 
I address these specific arguments and more general aspects of 
Professor Kaplow and Warren's approach in sections A through c. 
The analysis in sections A and B establishes several points using 
the same example that Professors Kaplow and Warren use in their 
response . Each of these points demonstrates the robustness of the 
result that the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting . First, that result is independent 
of whether one uses market value or present value as a baseline 
measure or as a measure of the after-tax outcome to be compared to 
the baseline . Second, it does not matter whether one uses the no 
5 .  See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 408 n .  3 9, 
6 .  See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 407-09 . 
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tax world or the pre-tax results in the tax world in constructing 
the baseline measure . Finally, the result is independent of the 
accounting period . 
The first and final points combined with the discussion that 
follows in section C address Professor Kaplow and Warren's specific 
arguments .  But the analysis in sections A and B also raises the 
issue of whether Professor Kaplow and Warren implicitly reject use 
of modern finance theory to define "value" in applying the Haig­
Simons ideal . They do not believe that the CFIT necessarily meets 
the Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting . But 
the three points demonstrate that that result follows independent 
of which of the common candidates for measuring the baseline or 
after-tax outcome one adopts if one computes the value of wealth 
changes in a manner consistent with modern finance theory . 
Readers who find the three points intuitively clear or who 
wish to focus first on a direct discussion of the issues that 
Professors Kaplow and Warren raise may profitably omit sections A 
and B .  I n  section C I discuss their own analysis and conclude that 
their position either results from confusion concerning accounting 
periods or requires rejecting the use of modern finance theory to 
interpret "value . 11 
Professors Kaplow and Warren also make a second kind of 
argument against my use of present value as a concept of value . 
They note that Haig, Simons, and many others see the CFIT as a form 
of consumption tax that does not meet the ideal that Haig and 
Simons specified . Since the CFIT necessarily implements that ideal 
given my concept of value, rejection of the CFIT by Haig and Simons 
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implies a rejection of that concept of value . 7 This argument is 
not really an analytic argument at all . It holds that Haig and 
Simons are the authoritative expositors of how their own ideal is 
to be applied. But the Haig-Simons ideal is just that -- an ideal 
and in my opinion Haig and Simons misunderstood what concept of 
value best implements it . This is unsurprising . Modern finance 
theory conceptions of value were not as dominant when Haig and 
Simons wrote as today . As Professors Kaplow and Warren point out , 
some , such as Irving Fisher, used such conceptions of value even in 
the days of Haig and Simons . a In section D ,  I provide an economic 
and historical perspective on our debate that locates my arguments 
relative to those of Fisher and his modern successors . This 
complements the discussion in my original article that dealt only 
with Fisher's successors and not with Fisher himself . 9 
A .  Analysis a t  Time O 
This  section shows that the result that the CFIT implements 
the Haig-Simons ideal is independent of the choice of v�rious 
market value and present value concepts as measures of after-tax 
outcomes and of a baseline against which to test those outcomes . 
In this section the focus is on the time of investment . Section B 
shows that the independence result generalizes to any accounting 
period, The Appendix contains a more technical demonstration of 
some of the points in the text . 
7 .  See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 409-11 . 
B. See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 399-400 . 
9 .  See Strnad , Taxation of Income from Capital: A 
Theoretical Reappraisal ,  3 7  STAN . L .  REV . 102 3 ,  1069-71 n .  108 (1985 ) .  
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Consider the example used by Professors Kaplow and Warren: A 
riskless investment in the no tax world consists of expending 100 
at time zero to obtain 121 in revenues at time 1 .  The no tax world 
riskless rate of return is assumed to be 10% , and this implies that 
the present value of 121 dollars to be received at time l is 110 at 
time o,lO In the no tax world , this present value of 110 at time 
o is also the market value at time O of the right to receive 121 at
time 1 .  People can borrow and lend freely and without risk at 10% 
in the no tax world . Thus, the right to receive a payment 
risklessly one period in the. future will sell for whatever price 
will result in a 10% riskless return . In this case that price is 
110 since 110 x 1 . 1  = 121 .  
Since the 110 i s  10 greater than the cost of 100 for our 
investor , the investor is making an instantaneous profit of 10 by 
making the investment . The investor could realize this gain 
immediately by selling the right to the 121 for 110 right after 
investing the 100 . This potential profit of 10 from sale at time o 
is equal to the "net present value" of the investment , the present 
value of 110 minus the time o cost of 100 . 
Suppose the CFIT applies in the example . 11 Then the taxpayer 
10. With a 10% discount rate , the present value of 121 is 
121/(1 . 1 )  = 110 .  For a discussion o f  the concepts of present value 
and net present value , see Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1044-45 .  That 
discussion includes an algebraic exposition of the concepts . See 
id . 
1 1 .  Throughout the analysis in this rejoinder, I make the 
same simplifying assumptions about tax rate structure and the tax
treatment of losses that I make in the bulk of my original 
article . Thus , tax rates are taken to be constant over time and to
be independent of the amount of income (no progressivity or 
regressivity) , full loss offsets are assumed to be available ,  and 
there is no special rate on capital gains . For a discussion of 
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will receive a deduction of 100 at time o and will have taxable 
income of 1 2 1  at time 1 .  As I demonstrated in my original article, 
the after-tax riskless interest rate in a world with a CFIT will be 
the same as the no tax world riskless interest rate if one ignores 
general equilibrium effects . 12 That is, investors will evaluate 
after-tax returns using the same 10% riskless rate as in the no tax 
world . 
Now what will be the market value at time o of the right to 
receive 121  before-tax at time 1 if the CFIT applies? The answer 
is 110 . If  a person buys the right at time o for 110, that person 
will deduct 110 at that time . Assuming. a tax rate of . 50 the 
deduction reduces the after-tax investment to 55, At time 1, the 
person will receive 60. 5 ( = 121/ 2 )  after tax at time 1 .  But 60 . 5  
i s  exactly 10% larger than 55 . The 110 market price i s  right: The 
bargain is struck so that the after-tax market rate of return 
ensues . Note that this tax world market price of 110 is equal to 
the market value and present value in the no tax world .  
One can also define a "pre-tax present value" i n  the tax 
world . This is the present value of a transaction assuming it is 
the only untaxed transaction in that world . The relevant riskless 
rate to use in evaluating such an investment is the after-tax 
riskless rate s ince this is the rate available on other 
investments . 13  In our example, this means that the pre-tax present 
these assumptions and their appropriateness given the points that I
wish to make, see Strnad, supra note 9, at 1042-4 3 .  
1 2 . See Strnad, � note 9, at 1053-56 .
1 3 . See Strnad, supra note 9, at 1062 n .  93 . 
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value is the same as the no tax world present value . Both involve 
valuing the right to receive 121 at time l using a 10% riskless 
rate, and the result is llo . 14 
The example demonstrates that under the CFIT in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting the no tax world present value, the 
no tax ·world market value, the tax world market value, and the tax 
world pre-tax present value are all the same . It does not matter 
which is used as a benchmark in testing the CFIT against the 
Haig-Simons ideal . Using any of them as benchmarks, in the example 
there is an instantaneous increase in wealth of 10 at time O: 
Present value or market value of 110 results from an investment 
with cost lOo . 15 
Now consider the measurement of the after-tax outcome that 
will be compared to one of the benchmarks . Suppose the investor is 
in the 50% bracket at all times . Then the 100 investment is only 
50 after tax, and the investor will receive only 60 . 5  at time l 
after tax . The net present value calculated using a 10% after-tax 
riskless rate is 60 . 5/1 . l  - 50 = 5. If the investor sells the
investment at market value right after it is made, the investor 
14 . This point generalizes: For a riskless investment, the 
pre-tax present value will be the same as the no tax world present
value in a non-general-equilibrium setting if the after-tax 
riskless rate is the same as the no tax world riskless rate . See
Strnad, supra note 9, at 1061-62 . 
15 . In his past work Professor Warren has stated that under 
the Haig-Simons ideal a tax should be imposed on the difference in
wealth ex post between two points in time . See Warren, Would a 
Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L .  J .  1081,
1118-19 (1980) .  Presumably, these ex post changes are changes in 
one of the four benchmarks listed here . See text accompanying 
notes 3 1-34 and note 33 infra (discussing definition of the value
of changes in wealth) . 
will be left with 5 after-tax: The sale is at 110 yielding 55 
after tax versus an after-tax investment cost of 50. Thus, 
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after-tax sales value and net present value are identical measures 
of the after-tax outcome. 
To summarize the results so far, consider the following 
possibilities for benchmarks and measures of changes in after-tax 
wealth at time O: 
Table l 
benchmark 
(1 ) change in no tax world
market value 
( 2 )  change in tax world 
market value 
(3 )  change in no tax world
present value 
(4 ) change in tax world 
pre-tax present value
! measure of change 
!in after-tax wealth 
I (A) net present value 






In the example, it does not matter which measure of after-tax 
wealth change one chooses from the second column, and it does not 
matter which benchmark one chooses from the first column: In each 
case for a 50% bracket taxpayer the benchmark increases by 10 and 
after-tax wealth changes by 5. The result is not peculiar to this 
particular example. In the Appendix I use some elementary algebra 
to show that in a non-general-equilibrium setting the equivalence 
of the benchmarks and the equivalence of the measures of after-tax 
outcome hold for any investment or borrowing transaction under the 
CFIT.16 
There is an argument that tax base theory requires use of the 
16. See text accompanying notes 69-70 infra (Appendix
Propositions 1 and 2 and associated discussion )  . 
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no tax world as a basis of comparison.17 There are also arguments 
about the choice between market value and present value as a 
benchmark in various situations and about whether one should use 
after-tax gain if sold or net present value as a measure of the 
value of the change in wealth.la But the outcome of these 
arguments will not alter the result that the CFIT implements the 
Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting . That 
result is true whether one uses market value or present value, 
whether one uses the no tax world or the pre-tax situation in the 
tax world as a basis for comparison, and whether one considers the 
case where the investment is sold or the case where it is not . 
Furthermore, with one exception, the traditional income tax 
generally does not implement the Haig-Simons id.eal in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting under any combination of one of the 
benchmarks and one of the measures of the after-tax change in 
wealth from the table above. The exception is when (B) is compared 
to (2 ) .  In this case, changes in tax world market value will 
result in changes of one minus the tax rate as large in after-tax 
sales value. This is because gain under the traditional income tax 
when an asset is sold is measured by the change in tax world market 
value. Comparing the traditional income tax with the Haig-Simons 
ideal under the other combinations of benchmark and measure of 
17. See Strnad, supra note 9, at 1035-1036 .
takes this position in some of his earlier work. 
n. 52. 
Professor Warren
See id . at 1040 
18. The Appendix provides some discussion about the meaning
of various benchmarks and measures of the value of after-tax 
changes in wealth . See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra and 
note 73 infra. But it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive
analysis of those issues here, and I do not attempt to do so. 
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after-tax outcome is a bit complex, and this task is relegated to 
the Appendix,19 
The equivalence of the measures of after-tax outcome for the 
CFIT in the second column of Table 1 has a significance that will 
be familiar to tax scholars . For instantaneous changes in net 
wealth at time o the CFIT is acting as the ideal accrual based 
income tax under the Haig-Simons standard . If a . 50 taxpayer holds 
the investment at that time, his net present v�lue is 5 which is 
half of the instantaneous increase in market value ( in either the 
tax or no tax world) , In effect, that taxpayer has been taxed on 
his accrued gain at time o .  The result is the same as if the 
taxpayer sells immediately after making the investment at time O: 
There is a tax of 5 on an increase in wealth of 10 . The 
traditional income tax does not have this quality of being an ideal 
accrual based tax under the Haig-Simons standard . 20 Any such tax 
must be equivalent to the CFIT . 21 
19 . See note 27 infra (describing the Appendix results ) .
20 . After-tax net present value is the value to the investor
of the increase in wealth at time O if the investment is not sold 
immediately at that time . But under the traditional income tax, 
that net present value generally will not relate in a Haig-Simons 
manner to the change in market value at time o in either the tax 
world or the no tax world . See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra
(Appendix Proposition 5, tax world market value as benchmark) and 
Strnad, supra note 9 at 1078-80 ( summarizing results with no tax 
world market value as benchmark) . 
Note also that if the traditional income tax involves less 
favorable cost recovery treatment than the CFIT, net present value
will be higher than after-tax gain if sold . See note 73 infra . 
Thus, the taxpayer will be better off holding the investment than 
selling it . 
21 . Since the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal at time 
o ,  any tax that implements that ideal must provide cost deductions 
for investment transactions that are equivalent in present value to
the expensing treatment of the CFIT . Thus, if cost deductions are 
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This example also illustrates an important point that I made 
in my original article that follows from applying modern finance 
theory to tax base analysis: The realization doctrine does not 
necessarily result in a deviation from the Haig-Simons ideal when 
one takes into account the fact that future taxes reduce the 
present value of increases in the value of an investment for the 
person who does not realize income from the investment by sale or 
otherwise . 22 
B .  The Irrelevance of the Choice o f  Accounting Period: Times 
After Time o 
In the examples in section A, the accounting period consisted 
of an infinitesimal amount of time after time o .  Where the 
accounting period is the calendar year, this approximates the case 
where revenues are not earned until many, many years after an 
investment is made . For example, the time interval between 
investment (time 0) and receipt of revenues (time 1 )  might be 1000 
years . But only some investments fall  into that category. 
Suppose, in contrast, that the accounting period is still the 
calendar year but that the time interval between investment at time 
O and the receipt of revenues at time 1 is 2 years . Then two 
assessments are of interest: the assessment made over the interval 
between time O and time 1/2. and the assessment made over the 
interval from time 1/2 to time 1 .  
In order to show that the results in section A will still 
delayed compared to CFIT treatment, they must be increased in size
an appropriate amount in compensation for the delay . 
22 . See Strnad, supra note 9, at 1039 n. 4 9 .
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apply if accounting periods other than an infinitesimal one 
following time o are considered , I extend the example to times 
between time O and time 1 by adding analysis at time 1/4 ,  time 1/2 
and time 3/4 . 2 3  As shown above , the market value {or equivalently 
the present value) of the investment at time o is 110 and at time 1 
is 121 in both the no tax world and the CFIT world . The following 
table indicates the no tax world market value at each of the five 
times under the assumption that the riskless interest rate is 
constant over the period and compounds to 10% for the whole 














By reasoning analogous to that for time o,  it can be shown 
that the no tax world market value and the CFIT world market value 
2 3 .  For an algebraic treatment of the times between time o 
and time 1 ,  see Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1084-89 . 
2 4 . The results drawn from the example would not change if
the riskless interest rate were allowed to vary over the period . 
See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1084-85, 
A constant interest rate that compounds to 10% over the period
is generated by solving for r in the equation er = 1 + . 10 .  Then 
the interest rate over a period of length t is r {t)  where r {t)  = 
ert - 1 .  For example , the interest rate for a period of length 1/4
would be about 2 . 41%. If you invest 110 at that rate for the first
quarter you end up with 112 . 65 at the end of that quarter . 
Reinvesting that at the same interest rate yields 115 . 3 7  at time
1/2 . Continuing to reinvest the proceeds at the end of each 
quarter yields 121  at time 1 .  
16 
are identica1,25 The present value of the investment in the hands 
of a 50% bracket taxpayer will be exactly one-half of this market 
value since half of the final return of 121 at time 1 will be taxed 
away at that time . 2 6  As a result , this taxpayer will  experience 
exactly one-half of the increase in market value as an increase in 
present value . This is illustrated by the following table: 
25 .  For example , take the 50% bracket taxpayer and the
investment at time 3/4 . If the taxpayer buys at 118 . 15 ,  the 
after-tax cost will be 59 . 075 . At time 1 ,  the taxpayer will 
receive 60 . 5  after tax . This results in rate of return of ( 60 . 5  -
59 . 075) /59 . 075 = . 02 4 1 .  But that i s  precisely the riskless rate of
return for investing for 1/4 of a pe�iod . See note 24  supra and 
recall that the riskless rate of return in the no tax world is the 
same as the after-tax riskless rate of return in a world with a 
CFIT . See text accompanying note 12 supra . 
2 6. This is the after-tax present value which is the value 
that the investor will see in the investment . The pre-tax present 
value will be identical to the market value by arguments similar to
those at text accompanying notes 10 and 13-14 supra . 
In general , the after-tax present value under the CFIT will be 
{l - T )  times the market value where T is the marginal tax rate of 
the taxpayer . This is because under the CFIT , all cash flows are 
reduced by the factor ( 1  - T) before discounting them to after-tax
present value . As a result, that present value will be ( 1  - T) 
less than the market value which is equal to the pre-tax present 
value, See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1068-69 {same point made 
algebraically for changes in present value at time O ) . See also 
Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 404 n .  2 2  {repeating the algebraic argument
made in Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1068-69 for the special case of a 
riskless investment) • 
This intuition and the fact that present value and market 
value are discounted cash flows lead Professors Kaplow and Warren
to call the result that the CFIT meets the Haig-Simons ideal a 
"tautology . "  See Reply , fil!ru;s note 4 ,  at 403 . Nonetheless, if
present value or market value are the proper concepts of value , 
then the result is true and meaningful . See text accompanying 
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Consider the investor who holds the investment between the time 1/4 
and the time 3/4 . Market value has increased by 118 . 15 - 112 . 65 
5 . 5  and present value has increased by 2 . 75 .  S imilarly , an 
investor who bought the investment at time 1/4 and sold it at time 
3/4 would make an after-tax profit of 2 . 75 at time 3/4 . This 
illustrates that the CFIT functions as a perfect accrual type of 
income tax under the Haig-Simons doctrine . Even if the investor 
does not sell an investment , the value of the investment in his or 
her hands is reduced at each moment by the appropriate tax rate . 
Furthermore , this value is identical to the value that would be 
realized after-tax on sale . The traditional income tax does not 
have these qualities . 27  
2 7 .  The analysis of the traditional income tax is complicated
by the fact that under that tax it is generally true that 
( 1 )  changes in no tax world market value are not equal to 
the corresponding changes in tax world market value; 
( 2 )  changes in after-tax sales value differ from the 
corresponding changes in present value . 
See text accompanying note 72  infra (Appendix Propositions 3 and 4 ) .
Consider the following table from the Appendix: 
Table 4 
benchmark 
( 1 )  change in no tax world
market value 
(2 ) change in tax world 
market value 
! measure of change 
jin after-tax wealth 
I (A) change in present value 
I (at time o: net present value) I (B) change in after-tax sales value 
I (at time o :  after-tax gain 
I if  sold) 
c. Value According to Professors Kaplow and Warren
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So far I have shown that in a non-general-equilibrium setting 
the CFIT is the ideal accrual-type income tax under the Haig-Simons 
criterion and that this showing is independent of the " accounting 
period" considered . It does not matter whether one is considering 
the infinitesimal period at and after time O (to analyze how taxes 
impact on " instantaneous" changes in wealth at time O ) ,  the entire 
period between time O and time 1, or some smaller period between 
those two times . 
In criticizing my position, Professors Kaplow and Warren make 
the mistake of comparing my results for an infinitesimal period at 
and after time O to the changes in wealth that occur over the 
longer accounting period from time o to time 1 .  They construct an 
example of an investment that costs 100 at time O and yields 110 at 
In my original article ,  I show that the traditional income tax does
not meet the Haig-Simons ideal when that ideal is applied by 
comparing (A) with (1) . The Appendix shows that the same result is
true for interpretations of the Haig-Simons ideal that involve 
comparing (A) with ( 2 )  or (B) with (1) but not for an 
interpretation that compares (B) with ( 2 ) . See text accompanying
notes 70-73 infra (Appendix Propositions 5 - 7 and related 
discussion ) . In the case where (B) is compared to ( 2 ) , after-tax 
gain is exactly ( 1  - T) times the change in tax world market value 
where T is the tax rate . That result is true because an increase 
in tax world market value will be taxed at the statutory rate upon
sale of the investment under the traditional income tax . 
The table above does not contain the benchmarks consisting of 
changes in present value in the no tax world and changes in pre-tax
present value in the tax world . These are not necessary . Present 
value and market value are equivalent benchmarks in the no tax 
world . See text accompanying note 10 supra and text accompanying 
note 69 infra . Pre-tax present value in the tax world is the same as
no tax world market value and present value if the after-tax discount
rate in the tax world equals the no tax world discount rate . See 
no'te 14 supra . Furthermore , using a different assumption about how
taxes affect discount rates would not lead to the Haig-Simons ideal
being met when pre-tax present value is the benchmark . 
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time 1 .  This investment does not cause any change in wealth at 
time zero given a riskless discount rate of 10%. They then state 
that "the taxable change in wealth under the Haig-Simons approach 
is $10 , not zero , ,,,1128 They also note that at time zero , the net 
present value of the taxes that the government will collect is 
zero . In making that observation , they implicitly assume that the 
proper discount rate for government revenues is the same as the 
discount rates that individuals use in evaluating their investment 
and borrowing transactions,29 They claim that this example shows 
that I have defined income differently from the standard 
Haig-Simons formulation . 
But at time O the Haig-Simons income from this investment is 
zero . The investor holds an investment that has a market value and 
present value equal to its cost of 100, No change in wealth has 
yet occurred, It is only after time zero that the investment 
increases in value to the final amount of 110 at time 1 .  I t  is 
therefore entirely appropriate that the net present value of 
government revenues at time o (calculated using the same discount 
rate that the investor uses ) is zero .  If  the increase of $10 that 
occurs after time zero is of concern, then an analysis like that in 
28 . See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 407 . 
29 . Cf, Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1066 n .  102 {government 
revenues may be discounted at a different rate than the after-tax 
discount rate that individuals use) . 
Applying a 50% tax rate in their example , the government gives
up 50 in taxes at time O due to the taxpayer's deduction of 100 and
gains 55 in taxes at time 1 .  Using a 10% discount rate , government
revenues have zero net present value because the time O present 
value of the 55 in tax revenues is 55/ ( 1 . 1 )  = 50 which is equal to
the 50 in revenues given up at time o .
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section B is appropriate .JO 
Thus ,  one possible source of Professors Kaplow and Warren's 
rejection of my claim that the CFIT and not the traditional income 
tax implements the Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium 
setting is the one that we have just examined . They may have 
failed to distinguish properly between different accounting 
periods . 3 1  But there is another possibility . They may define 
"value" in a way that is foreign to modern finance theory . 
I f  this second possibility is true then Professors Kaplow and 
Warren arguably are engaging in exactly what they accused me and 
Irving Fisher of doing : defining terms to insure that a certain 
result {the traditional income tax) follows from the words of a 
norm (the Haig-Simons ideal ) that is popular. 32 We agree on the 
Haig-Simons definition of income as stated in their response and 
30 .  In this example, the CFIT and any other tax that allows a 
a total deduction of 100 spread out in any manner between time o 
and time 1 inclusive will result in a tax on a gain of 10. If  that
entire period is the accounting period and all the Haig-Simons 
ideal requires is that only 10 be taxed in net , then all of these 
taxes meet the ideal . IDJ.t only the CFIT will meet the Haig-Simons 
ideal for fil:lY accounting period when changes in wealth are measured
by market value or present value . 
3 1 .  Professors Kaplow and Warren also may have been confused
by my point that to assess the initial desirability of an 
investment , the net present value at time O is the appropriate 
criterion . See Strnad, supra note 9 ,  at 1086 n .  144 (original 
point) and Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 405 n .  26 ( interpretation by 
Professors Kaplow and Warren) .  All this is saying is that a person 
considering making an investment at time o will look at net present 
value at that time . That net present value takes into account all 
the anticipated future revenues and costs for the investment . 
Under Haig-Simons theory, however , no particular time is more 
important than any other. This is because the accounting period of
interest may be any particular slice of an investment's life .  For 
this reason I was careful in my original article to analyze each 
possible time period . 
32, See Reply , supra note 4 ,  at 410 .  
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the beginning of this rejoinder . But we may disagree about the 
meaning of the word "value . "  I attribute to that word the idea of 
market value or present value and use elementary finance theory to 
compute these values in a non-general-equilibrium setting . If  
"value" does not mean market value or  present value , what does it 
mean?3 3  There are value concepts that would reject the CFIT as 
implementing the Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium 
setting , but these concepts are in open conflict with modern 
finance theory . 3 4  To adopt one of them would be to flout the usual 
meanings given to the word "value" under that theory . 
There is more than a mere debate about semantics here . The 
Haig-Simons ideal expresses an important normative idea : that a 
fair tax would tax changes in the value of a person's stock of 
wealth . In a non-general-equilibrium setting the CFIT taxes these 
changes as they occur if value is taken to mean market value or 
present value . The traditional income tax does not . 
3 3 .  Professors Kaplow and Warren state at one point that 
"[a ]dvocates o f  the Haig-Simons concept can consistently understand
that wealth at any moment is the present discounted value of future
flows • • • •  11 See Reply , supra note 4 ,  at 409 . At another point 
they refer to Haig's use of the term "money value" instead of 
present value . See id. at 408 n. 3 9 . These seem to suggest an 
acceptance of present value and/or market value as the meaning of
"value" in the Haig-Simons definition . 
3 4 .  Consider Professors Kaplow and Warren's example of an 
investment that costs 100 at time O and yields 110 at time 1 when
the discount rate is 10\, If one defines the change in value for
this investment to be no change until time 1 and then an increase 
of 10, then the appropriate "Haig-Simons" tax treatment would be to
allow no cost recovery until the end . But under elementary finance
theory , the increase in value of the investment occurs gradually 
between times o and 1 .  Similar definitions o f  "value" can be 
constructed to justify less drastic delays in cost recovery from
the moment cost is incurred . But they also conflict with 
conceptions of value under modern finance theory . 
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As discussed in the introduction , there is an historical 
argument for an alternative interpretation of the term "value.11 35 
Given the belief by Haig and Simons that their ideal js met by the 
traditional income tax and not by the CFIT, they must have shared 
in some such alternative interpretation . But is there any 
normative reason to cling to this historical practice? Professors 
Kaplow and Warren do not present one . Market value and present 
value take into account the time value of money in a way that is 
considered standard and unobjectionable in the economics profession 
and in business practice. This would seem the proper way to 
interpret the ideal that Haig and Simons originally stated . 
Each of us , like Humpty Dumpty , can assert the right to define 
terms as we please . But defining value so that·it does not 
coherently allow for the time value of money in all accounting 
periods has serious substantive overtones .  Why would anyone want 
to do that?3 6  
35 . See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra . 
3 6 .  Professors Kaplow and Warren begin their response with a 
quote from Henry Simons suggesting that much of our debate is about
terminology rather than substance . In that passage Simons was 
suggesting that the same was true concerning his debate with Irving
Fisher . A passage from Fisher published a year earlier than the 
one quoted from Simons is instructive on this point: 
"It is my earnest hope that the foregoing presentation of
the income problem will  carry conviction . So far as I can 
see , the only possible controversy will be over terminology. 
Some persons , while admitting all my contentions as true under
my concept of income may pref er still another income 
concept • • • •  
I might claim that it ought not be a serious matter 
that anyone has a right to define any word to suit himself. 
But this would be dodging the issue . For most people and for
many economists words are more important than ideas. " 
Fisher, Income in Theory and Income Taxation in Practice , 5 
ECONOMETRICA 11 53 ( 193 7 ) . 
I do not believe that Professors Kaplow and Warren are among 
D .  An Economic and Historical Perspective on the Debate 
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My original article points out that others have made similar 
arguments to mine , 3 7  and Professors Kaplow and Warren correctly 
observe that the lineage of these arguments extends back a half 
century to Irving Fisher. Fisher himself argued that changes in 
present value provide the proper benchmark against which to test an 
income tax and that this benchmark indicates that cash flow is the 
appropriate tax base,38 He did not , however, discuss how the 
after-tax result that will be compared against the benchmark should 
be measured . Thus , he does not consider the possibility that 
discount rates (either the riskless component or the risk premium) 
are altered by a CFIT tax system . My original article makes two 
points concerning this possibility . First , the CFIT will have the 
general properties envisioned by Fisher only when discount rates 
remain the same in the CFIT world as in the no tax world . Second , 
assuming that the discount rates do remain the same is legitimate 
under either of the two major conceptions of what it means to 
ignore general equilibrium price changes . 39  
those for whom "words are more important than ideas . "  But they do
not make any effective argument about why "value" in the Haig­
Simons definition should not be interpreted in accord with modern 
finance theory : as present value or market value . Neither do they
propose or defend any alternative definition of value . 
3 7 .  See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1069 n .  108, 
3 8 . See Fisher , supra note 3 6 ,  at 4-10 , 24-25 .
3 9 .  One major conception is that the after-tax rate of return
for any given investment (regardless of riskiness) is the same in 
the CFIT world as in the no tax world . The other is that each 
investment will have the same pre-tax rate of return in the CFIT 
world as in the no tax world, Under either conception, assuming 
that the discount rate is the same in the CFIT world as in the no
tax world is appropriate . See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1053-56 . 
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Fisher's successors have traditionally focused on the 
consumption streams of individuals over time while my original 
article and parts of Fisher's work focus on transactions that 
extend over more than one accounting period . 40 I see two 
interesting points that follow from this difference in emphasis.  
First , assumptions about the impact of taxes on discount rates 
have different implications when one examines consumption streams 
as opposed to transactions . For example , consider the assumption 
that taxes have no impact on discount rates: The after-tax 
discount rate in the tax world is the same as the no tax world 
discount rate . 4 1  If consumption streams are the object of study, 
then the traditional income tax and the CFIT are equivalent under 
this assumption because individuals have the same opportunities to 
shift consumption between periods under either tax . 42 But at the 
same time the two taxes have different effects on particular 
transactions . Some transactions will be profitable under the CFIT 
but unprofitable if cost recovery is delayed under the traditional 
40 .  See Strnad , � note 9 ,  at 1069 n .  108 (citing and 
discussing sources) .  This is clearly only a difference in emphasis
because individuals use transactions to shift the timing of their 
consumption streams . 
4 1 .  In my original article I called this assumption "the 
first view . "  I t  i s  one o f  two plausible non-general-equilibrium 
assumptions about the impact of taxes on discount rates . See note
39  supra . But it also may be an appropriate general equilibrium 
assumption in some instances . See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1054 
n .  79  ( first view may hold in cases such as the U . S .  corporate tax
where taxed investment sector is small compared to entire range of
possible investments) .
42.  See Strnad , � note 9 ,  at 1071 n .  108 (final paragraph
of note providing numerical example) . 
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income tax . 4 3  
A second way that the contrasting emphasis on  consumption 
streams and transactions is interesting is that it shows how the 
CFIT, ostensibly a consumption tax, can also be a tax on 
consumption plus the change in net wealth . Professors Kaplow and 
Warren find this a mystery that casts doubt on my position . 4 4  But 
it is no mystery : The taxes on future consumption streams that 
flow from an investment transaction reduce the pre-tax increase in 
wealth from that transaction by an appropriate amount during each 
period preceeding the consumption . 
Consider the example from sections A and B .  Suppose that a 
50% tax rate applies, and the investor uses the transaction to 
reduce consumption by 100 at time l in order to consume 121 at time 
1 .  From a consumption stream viewpoint, the CFIT is an ideal 
consumption tax: There is a deduction at time o of 100 to reflect 
the diminished consumption at that time and there is 121 in taxable 
income at time l to reflect the increase in consumption .at that
point . 
At the same time, the tax is properly reaching the changes in 
net wealth during each accounting period. Consider an accounting 
period consisting of an infinitesimal time at and after time o .
The investment increases the investor's wealth by 10 during this 
4 3 .  In a non-general-equilibrium setting individuals are 
insulated from these effects, They can invest at the same 
after-tax market rate of return under both tax regimes . See 
Strnad, supra note 9 ,  at 1071 n .  108 ( final paragraph of note 
indicates that under consumption stream analysis in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting only the market rate of return 
matters, not how particular investments are affected) . 
4 4, See Reply, supra note 4, at 411-12 n. 54 . 
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period whether that increase is measured by the change in the 
market value of the investor's assets or by the change in the 
pre-tax present value of those assets . 45 But the after-tax profit 
if sold and the increase in after-tax present value if the 
investment is retained will only be 5. Thus, the investment 
transaction is treated in a Haig-Simons manner within the 
accounting period: The reduction of consumption by 100 in that 
period is reflected by the deduction of 100 at time o: Only 
current consumption is in the accounting tax base . But at the same 
time the deduction combined with the tax at time l on 121 reduces 
the increase in net wealth at time O due to the investment by the 
proper amount even if the investment is not sold at that time . 46 
II . Transactional Analysis and Its Competitors 
Tax policy analysis that proceeds by comparing particular 
transactions without taking into account the effect of the tax 
system on pre-tax prices is a technique that I called 
45 .  And it does not matter whether this change in present 
value or change in market value is measured in the tax or no tax
world . See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra . 
4 6 .  A similar conceptualization appears in Aaron & Galper, A
Tax on Consumption, Gifts and Bequests and Other Strategies for 
Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 106, 112 (J. PECHMAN, ed . 1984 ) .
They note that : 
• • •  the expenditure tax base is simply the familiar 
Haig-Simons definition of income extended from one year to the
lifetime and expressed in present value terms • • • .  Because of 
its similarity to the annual Haig-Simons income tax, we shall
refer to it as a lifetime income tax, because it would tax 
total consumption plus change in net worth over an 
individual's lifetime . 
My argument extends this in a natural way . If the CFIT tracks 
market value or present value within the annual accounting period, 
it is an annual Haig-Simons income tax as well as a lifetime 
Haig-Simons income tax . 
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"transactional analysis" in my original article. 47 An alternative 
method examined there is to assess the effects of taxes on 
individuals "as accurately as possible" given existing economic 
technology . This often would involve using general equilibrium 
techniques that take into account the complex changes in pre-tax 
prices that may accompany any particular change in the tax system. 
Professors Kaplow and Warren agree that this alternative step is 
desirable . 48 
But they criticize my discussion in three ways . First , they 
claim that transactional analysis is a false target that is 
peculiar to my own original article .  Second , they argue that I 
have set up a false dichotomy that ignores "intermediate" forms of 
analysis . Third , they criticize some of the applications of 
general equilibrium thinking in my paper . I deal with each of 
these critic isms in turn . 
A .  Transactional Analysis as a Target 
Professors Kaplow and Warren state that all sophisticated tax 
policy analysts would concede that discussions of policy "should, 
to the extent feasible ,  take into account effects of the changes on 
taxpayer behavior . 1149 I believe that , if pressed , many such 
analysts would make such a concession . But , at the same time , 
transactional analysis is used heavily in the legal and economic 
4 7 .  See Strnad , �note 9 ,  at 1023 . 
48 . See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 400, 4 16 .
4 9 . Reply , supra note 4 ,  at 414 . 
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literature and the ensuing results are taken quite seriously . 50 It 
is not the "straw man" that Professors Warren and Kaplow suggest it 
is . 51 
It is also important to emphasi.ze that part of my purpose in 
criticizing transactional analysis is to put the 
non-general-equilibrium results in my original article ( and in part 
I of this rejoinder) in perspective . Those results point to the 
CFIT as implementing the Haig-Simons ideal but are based almost 
entirely on transactional analysis .  I state explicitly that 
because of the weaknesses of transactional analysis these results 
50 . The use of transactional analysis is so extensive that it 
seems pointless to give a series of examples . My original article 
cites some examples . See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1025 n .  5 and 
1032 n .  29 ( citing sources some of which rely partially or wholly 
on transactional analysis) . Very recent examples of sophisticated
tax policy scholars using transactional analysis to scrutinize 
investment and borrowing transactions are easy to find . See , �.g., 
Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a "Reverse Investment: An Analysis of
the Time Value of Money and the Appropriate Tax Treatment of Future
Costs , 26 TAX NOTES 925 ( 1985) and the sources cited therein . 
One of the most striking examples is mentioned by Professors 
Kaplow and Warren themselves in their reply . That is the Treasury
Department's estimates of the revenue losses due to various tax 
expenditures . These estimates are explicitly premised on the 
assumption that behavior would be unchanged if the particular 
provisions were not in place . For example ,  the revenue loss 
estimate for the exemption of state and local bond interest from 
taxation assumes that if  these bonds were not tax exempt the same 
people would buy the same quantities . See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at
4 15 n .  68. 
51 . I do not mean to suggest that transactional analysis is
always inappropriate . In some cases , a meaningful general 
equilibrium analysis of the impact of tax policy changes is not 
feasible .  In my original article, I did not attempt to determine 
in general which cases fall into that category . See Strnad, supra 
note 9 ,  at 1104-1105 . But I did note that some important tax 
policy issues such as choosing between the current U. S .  tax system
and alternatives such as the CFIT, are currently amenable to a 
meaningful general equilibrium analysis . 
should not be used as the basis of a new conventional wisdom.52 
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But they should be taken as sufficient to reject the old 
conventional wisdom , that the traditional income tax implements the 
Haig-Simons idea1.53
B. "Intermediate" Forms of Analysis 
Professors Kaplow and Warren criticize me for ignoring 
"intermediate" forms of analysis by positing general equilibrium 
analysis as the "polar" alternative to transactional analysis. In 
particular , they suggest that "partial equilibrium" analysis is 
sometimes appropriate. I agree and did not mean to imply otherwise 
in my original article. Partial equilibrium analysis is usually 
understood to mean limiting consideration to the impact of taxes on 
only one pre-tax price change , the one involving the taxed good or 
service.54 There may be cases where for empirical or other 
reasons ,  policy analysis needs to be limited to examining only one 
52. See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1024 , 1102-1104.
53. See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1037-38.
54. This is evident from public finance texts. See , g.g., 
R. BOADWAY and o. WILDASIN , PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 287 , 322 , 349 
(2nd ed. 1984 ) 1 R. TRESCH , supra note 1 ,  at 306-307 , 323. 
Thus , the term general equilibrium analysis covers cases that range
from the simple examples in my original article and in the reply by
Professors Warren and Kaplow where a few behavioral responses are 
taken into account to models with many production and consumption 
sectors , hundreds of equations , multiple time periods , and hundreds
of behavioral parameters. Professors Kaplow and Warren suggest 
that general equilibrium analysis comprises only the situation 
where one includes "every relevant factor" in the analysis and also
that it is l imited to some fairly recent , complex empirical 
models. See Reply, supra note 4 ,  at 414-15. But these limitations
contradict the accepted definition of the term. 
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price change,55 My main point is one that Professors Kaplow and 
Warren agree with : Tax policy analysts should use the best 
available techniques when they wish to make serious policy 
recommendations.56 
c. Particular Applications of General Equilibrium Analysis
Professors Kaplow and Warren criticize two of the applications 
of general equilibrium analysis in my original article. One 
involves my discussion of the possibility that particular tax 
policies may affect the pre-tax interest rate. The more important 
of the two is my attack on the conventional defense of the 
principle that the CFIT is equivalent to yield exemption , the 
exclusion of capital transactions from the tax system. I deal with 
each of these in turn. 
55. For theoretical analysis of broad-based taxes such as the
CFIT, the traditional income tax, or a sales tax covering many 
items , modeling almost always is general equilibrium in form. As a
leading graduate textbook in public finance states : 
The only sound theoretical approach to public sector problems 
is general equilibrium analysis ,  which we will use exclusively
throughout the text. Because of data and other resource 
restrictions , empirical analysis must frequently be partial in
scope , but theoretical analysis suffers no such handicaps , nor
should it. Specific instances of the pitfalls of theoretical 
partial equilibrium analysis abound in the public sector 
literature. 
See R. TRESCH, supra note 1 ,  at 14. Of course , theoretical partial 
equilibrium analysis may be useful as a classroom or textbook 
device to build up understanding. See R. BOADWAY and o. WILDASIN,
supra note 53 at 287 , 322. But this is a different task from that
of evaluating tax policy in a sophisticated way. 
56, The best model is not always the one that considers the
most price changes or that has the most equations. But it is 
inappropriate given 1985 modeling technology to analyze the 
"fairness" of taxes such as the CFIT and the traditional income tax
that almost certainly have significant and complex general 
equilibrium effects by ignoring most of these effects. 
3 1  
1 .  The General Equilibrium Impact of Taxes on Pre-tax Interest Rates 
Professors Kaplow and Warren point out that some distortions 
may occur independent of any general equilibrium impact of taxes on 
pre-tax interest rates . They specifically mention the distortions 
that may arise from maintaining different tax treatments for 
different investments . 
It is hard to see what position of mine they are criticizing 
here . I do not assert that the impact of tax policy on pre-tax 
interest rates is the only general equilibrium effect that 
policymakers should consider . To the contrary , my claim is that 
there are many general equilibrium effects that may be relevant ; 
and it is best to take as many of them into account as possible . 57 
The change in pre-tax interest rates is simply used as a clear 
example of a general equilibrium effect for purposes of exposition 
in my original article . In fact , in one discussion I describe that 
effect along with some others as "only a small portion of the 
relevant general-equilibrium effects , 1158 
In addition ,  the differential taxation of income from 
different types of investment is one of the situations where 
economists have put the most effort into using sophisticated 
general equilibrium analysis .  Indeed , some of the earliest 
applications of the most advanced models have focused on this 
situation . 59 This is not surprising as different industries face 
57 . See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1035-36 ,  1104-1106 . 
58. See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1058 ,
59 . See g.g. ,  Shaven and Whalley ,  A General Eguilibrium 
Calculation of the Effects of Differential Taxation of Income from
Capital in the u . s . , l J.  PUB . ECON . 281 ,  281-83 ( 1972) . 
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different production and demand conditions so that complex analysis 
is required to sort out the magnitude and direction of the overall 
effects of a tax system that treats different investments 
differently . otherwise ,  there can be little confidence about the 
magnitude or even the direction of the distortions . 60 
Furthermore , despite the assertion to the contrary by 
Professors Kaplow and Warren , .  effects due to interest rate changes 
can in theory undermine the conclusion that differential tax rules 
distort investment decisions . Investments differ in their time 
streams of costs and revenues . A strip mining operation may 
involve revenues at the start of the operation and then heavy costs 
over several years associated with reconstructing the land that was 
mined. Such an operation will appear more valuable if after-tax 
interest rates are higher. Meanwhile , projects that have all costs 
up front and revenues in the years following will experience the 
opposite effect from higher after-tax interest rates . In theory, 
taxing investments differently might offset the differential effect 
on the investments of the economy-wide change in after-tax interest 
rates due to the entire tax system . 
2 . The Nonequivalence of the CFIT and Yield Exemption
Professors Kaplow and Warren purport to rescue the 
conventional defense of the principle that the CFIT is equivalent 
to yield exemption from my critique of it by adding government 
financial transactions to the defense . Ironically, this only 
creates a model that is ideal both for illustrating my critique and
for demonstrating the points about the non-equivalence of the two 
60 . See Shaven and Whalley , supra note 59 . 
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tax treatments that I derived in a non-general-equilibrium setting 
in my original article. 
In the example used by Professors Kaplow and Warren the 
prevailing pre-tax interest rate is 10% . The government adds a 
CFIT at 50% rates to the prevailing labor income tax at 50% . The 
investor holds an investment that costs 100 at time O and yields 
110 at time 1 .  Under the CFIT , the after-tax cost and yields are 
cut in half: The cost is 50 and the investor �eceives 55 at time 
1 .  A t  the same time the government gives up 50 in taxes at time O 
in order to gain 55 in tax revenues at time 1 .  It is as if the 
government purchased one-half of the original investment at the 
investor's cost . Note that the net present value of the 
government's revenues for this transaction at time o is o when 
evaluated at the private after-tax discount rate of 10% : The time 
O present value of the 55 in tax revenues at time 1 is 50 , exactly 
equal to the revenues forgone at time o .
Private investment has been cut in half .  In order to explain 
how the demand for additional investment is satisfied without 
decreasing the market rate of return, Professors Kaplow and Warren 
assume that the government issues bonds at the market rate of 10%. 
Thus ,  the investor above buys a bond that will yield 110 at time 1 ,  
and that bond costs 100 at time O .  Since the investor can deduct 
that 100 cost at time o and is taxed on the 110 at time 1 ,  this 
bond has exactly the same after-tax consequences as the original 
investment . Holding both together replicates yield exemption: The 
investor bears an after-tax cost of 100 at time o to gain 110 at 
time 1 .  No additional real investment is necessary so that neither 
3 4  
a decline in the marginal productivity o f  capital nor a change in 
the market rate of return need be of concern . The bond also 
cancels out the tax revenue timing consequences of thA CFIT for the 
government since the government gains 50 (after considering the 
impact of the bondholder's deduction) upon issuing the bond and 
must pay 55 (net of additional taxes collected from the bondholder) 
at time 1 .  Furthermore , this government transaction has a net 
present value of O when evaluated at the private after-tax discount 
rate of 10% . 
The non-general-equilibrium analysis in my original article 
indicates that yield exemption and the CFIT are equivalent for 
breakeven transactions: The government simply "buys" part of the 
investment at its market value, and the investor can use the sale 
proceeds to buy another investment that yields the market rate of 
return (which is the same before and after tax under the CFIT) . 61  
Adding in borrowing at the market rate by the government means that 
no additional physical investment need be made in order to put 
investors in the same position they were in under yield exemption. 
But my original article also indicated that the CFIT and yield 
exemption are not equivalent for "profitable" transactions , those 
that earn greater than the market rate of return . These 
investments are of particular interest under tax base theory since 
they involve an increase in net wealth at the time the investment 
is made . Suppose that in the example above there is another 
investor who invests at 100 and earns 121 instead of 110 at time 
l, This investment creates an instantaneous increase in wealth at 
6 1 .  See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1069-1072 , 1078.  
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time 0 of 10 before considering taxes . 62 Then under the CFIT at a 
50% rate the government seizes one-half of this profit by forcing 
the investor to "sell" half  the investment to the government at the 
investor's cost . The government pays 50 in lost revenues at time o 
to gain 60 . 5  in revenues at time l .  These tax revenue effects have 
a net present value of 5 for the government , leaving the investor 
with only one-half of the before-tax gain of 10. Under yield 
exemption , the investor keeps the entire gain of 10, and the net 
present value of government revenues is zero , 
It  will not help for the government to issue bonds at the 
market rate in this case .  Those bonds will not substitute in the 
investor's hands for the loss of half of the profitable 
transaction . The government could issue a special bond to the 
Particular investor where the bond costs 100 and yields 121 ,  and 
this would cancel out the tax effects , 6 3  But it  would also reduce 
the net present value of government revenues from 5 to o .  Issuing 
the bond has a net present value of -5 for the government :  It 
gains 50 at time O (after considering the effect of the investor's 
deduction of the 100 cost of the bond) and gives up 60 . 5  at time 1 
62 ,  See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra . 
6 3 .  By issuing the bond , the government would allow the 
investor to gain 60 . 5  at time l after-tax for only 50 after-tax at
time O although the market value of the right to have 60 , 5  
after-tax at time 1 would be 55 since 55 x 1 . 1  = 60,5 . This 
exactly cancels out the fact that under the CFIT the government 
forced the investor to sell the right to 60 . 5  after-tax for only
50 . 
The government could not issue the bond to the public in 
general . The bond earns above the market rate of return , and 
whoever purchased it at 100 would have an instantaneous gain of 5 
after tax . But that gain must be given to the investor to put him
in a position equivalent to yield exemption . 
( net of taxes received from the investor) , The only way out of 
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this dilemma is if there is  an additional physical capital 
investment available in the economy that costs 100 and yields 121. 
Then there is no need for the government to issue a special bond . 
The investor can simply double his physical capital investment. 
But this runs into precisely the declining marginal productivity of 
capital (and declining rate of return) possibilities that I raised 
in my original article . These possibilities make the usual 
equivalence story extremely suspect as a general-equilibrium 
argument . 64 
In summary, the CFIT is a tax on pure profits ,  and government 
revenues have net present value at the time of each investment to 
the extent there are pure profits . Under yield exemption , the 
government does not tax pure profits and gives up the associated 
gain in net present value . The government cannot change that 
result by engaging in transactions that have zero net present value 
such as borrowing at the market rate of interest . 65 
64 . See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1036-1037 .  
Note that the same problems arise i f  the government issues the
special bond and then seeks out additional profitable physical 
investment on its own in order to offset the loss from issuing the
bond . 
65 . Professors Kaplow and Warren acknowledge that 
• • •  cash flow taxation and exemption of capital income may have
implications for . • •  the Treasury's ability to share in any 
difference between the rate of return in the private sector 
and the rate of interest on government debt • . • .  
Reply , supra note 4 ,  at 419 n .  81 . What I have shown here is that 
one of the implications is that the government cannot make the CFIT
and yield exemption equivalent by engaging in borrowing that has 
zero net present value if the present value of government revenues
is assessed at the private discount rate . 
III. Conclusions 
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The Haig-Simons ideal is  an important normative concept. But 
using it requires that one specify a method of measuring the value 
of changes in wealth. I use market value and present value , the 
concepts of value employed in modern finance theory. Professors 
Kaplow and Warren disagree with a result that I show follows from 
those concepts of value : That the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons 
ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting. But their critique is 
ineffective because they do not present an alternative concept of 
value and give reasons for using it in the definition of the Haig­
simons ideal instead of market value or present value. It is 
questionable whether such an alternative concept can be constructed 
that is also consistent with the idea of value contained in modern 
finance theory. 
Professors Kaplow and Warren generally agree with my position 
that it is important to take general equilibrium effects into 
account in assessing alternative tax policies. But their attempt 
to make a general equilibrium argument for the equivalence of the 
CFIT and yield exemption fails. In fact, using their approach 
reinforces the conclusion in my original article that the 
equivalence holds in a non-general-equilibrium setting only for 
breakeven transactions. 
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Appendix: Present Value , Market Value and After-Tax Sales Value 
In applying the Haig-Simons definition of income there are two 
places where it is important to specify the concept of "value" that 
is being applied. First , there must be a "benchmark" value of the 
change in net wealth against which to compare the results of a 
tax. ,In my original paper I use net present value at time O and 
changes in present value after time O in the no tax world as 
benchmarks. Second, there must be a measure of the increase in 
value experienced after-tax to compare against the benchmark. In 
my original article,  I use net present value at time o and present 
value after time 0 in the tax world as the concepts of value for 
that purpose. The justification for this is that present value 
represents the after-tax amount that the owner would have to pay to 
obtain a similar after-tax return in the marketplace.66  This 
concept of value is particularly appropriate when the owner of an 
investment or borrowing opportunity never sells it. 
There are other concepts of value , however. First , as an 
alternative benchmark for applying the Haig-Simons doctrine there 
is what is commonly thought of as "market value." This is the 
pre-tax amount that the investment would sell for in the tax world 
or , if  market value in the no tax world is of concern, the amount 
that the investment would sell for in the no tax world. Second, 
for measuring the investor's after-tax change in value one can use 
"after-tax sales value." This is the amount that the owner would 
realize after tax if the investment were sold. This amount is 
affected by the tax treatment of the buyer as well as that of the 
66. See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1044-45, 1056-57 . 
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seller since the buyer's tax treatment will affect the pr.e-tax 
amount that the buyer will be willing to pay for the investment . 
This Appendix shows that the main results of my original article do 
not change if these alternative concepts of value are used instead 
of net present value or present value . 67 
In order to use concepts of "market value , "  it is necessary to 
model a market for investments . 68 I construct a simple model here 
that is consistent with the model set up in my original article . 
General equilibrium price changes will be ignored , and a tax rate 
that is common to all taxpayers is assumed to be constant over 
time . The market for investments is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive so that investments will sell at a price that makes 
them a zero net present value transaction to the buyer at the 
prevailing after-tax market rate of return . For simplicity (and 
without affecting the results ) ,  I model only riskless investments . 
The conclusions in this Appendix are stated in several 
propositions that are established using the riskless version of the 
6 7 . This Appendix is similar to part of the earliest working
paper version of my original article .  see Strnad , "Taxation of 
Income from Capital : A Theoretical Reappraisal , "  California 
Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper No . 526 ,  
February 1984 version ,  Appendix H. I chose to omit this part from
the already lengthy published version for two reasons . First , the
equivalence of various market value concepts and net present value
or present value is fairly obvious for the CFIT in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting . Second , the results concerning
the traditional income tax are not affected significantly by 
considering market value concepts that diverge from net present
, value or present value . 
68 .  I l imit consideration to investment transactions . The
results for borrowing transactions would be similar because , as 
discussed in my original article ,  essentially these are the 
"negative" of some investment transaction . See Strnad , supra note
9 ,  at 104 1 ,  1045-46 ,  104 9 ,  1052, 1062 . 
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paradigmatic investment transaction in my original article. This 
involves the owner expending X at time o to receive revenues of Y 
for certain at time 1 .  A deduction o f  the proportion D of this 
cost is allowed at time o and the remaining proportion ( 1  - D) of 
the cost is deducted at time 1 .  When D = 1 ,  the CFIT i s  the tax 
treatment since the deductions exactly match the cash flow of the 
payment of X .  
I .  Statement and Discussion of the Propositions 
Before stating the propositions , it is important to note that 
present value and market value are equivalent in the no tax world 
given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets for 
investments . This is because the buyer and seller evaluate exactly 
the same cost and revenue streams using the same discount rates . 69 
As a result of this equivalence , the only no tax world benchmark 
that I will refer to is market value . 
The first two propositions concern the CFIT in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting : 
Proposition 1 Market value in the no tax world and market 
value in the tax world with a CFIT are identical . 
Proposition 2 At time O in a world with a CFIT, after-tax net 
present value is equal to after-tax profit on sale .  In the 
same world at times after time o, after-tax present value is
equal to after-tax sales value . 
These two propositions imply that the results in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting for the CFIT will not be affected 
by using any of no tax world market value , tax world market value, 
pre-tax present value in the tax world or no tax world present 
69 . See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 104 4-45, 1064 (making the
point algebraically at time O ) .  
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value as  a baseline . 70 Furthermore , using after-tax sales value 
instead of net present value or present value as the outcome to be 
measured against the baseline does not change the results . 
I define "traditional income tax" to mean a tax where the 
proportions D and ( 1  - 0) of time O cost deducted at times O and 1 
respectively are set to replicate economic depreciation in present 
value and o i 1,7 1  However , all the propositions below that are 
stated as applying to the traditional income tax hold whenever O i 
1 regardless of whether the particular o replicates economic 
depreciation . 
For the traditional income tax in a non-general-equilibrium 
setting the results depend to some extent on the relation between 
discount rates in the no tax world and the tax world . In 
particular , there are some special results when what I called the 
"second view" in my original article applies . At time o, this view 
means that rt = ( 1  - T ) r/ ( l  - OT) where r is the riskless rate in 
the no tax world and rt is the after-tax riskless rate in the tax 
world . After time o, this view requires that rt (t )  = 
( 1  - T ) r (t) / ( l  - OT) where r ( t) is the riskless rate for the period 
from time t to time 1 in the no tax world and rt (t )  is the 
70 .  In a non-general-equilibrium setting , the discount rate 
does not change from the no tax world to the CFIT world . The flows
of costs and revenues also do not change . As a result ,  the pre-tax
present value of an investment in the CFIT world will be the same 
as the present value in the no tax world . Present value in the no 
tax world is in turn identical to no tax world market value . Given
these equivalences ,  it follows from Proposition 1 that market value
in the CFIT world is identical to each of the three other measures 
of value . 
7 1 .  See Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1047-48 ( explaining how 
economic depreciation is set in the simple discrete time model used
here ) . 
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corresponding after-tax rate in the tax world . The second view can 
only hold for one value of o since there is only one riskless rate 
in each world . As discussed in my original article, 72 this view 
forces breakeven transactions treated for tax purposes with that 
value of O to conform to the Haig-Simons ideal . 
There are two propositions for the traditional income tax that 
are similar to Propositions l· and 2 .  
Proposition 3 Changes in market value in a world with a 
traditional income tax will be equal to corresponding changes
in market value in the no tax world only when the second view
applies . 
Proposition 4 At time o in a world with a traditional income
tax , net present value is not equal to after-tax sales value.
In the same world at times after time o, after-tax present
value generally is not equal to after-tax sales value . 
Consider the following table : 
Table 4 
benchmark 
( 1 )  change in no tax world
market value 
(2) change in tax world 
market value 
! measure of change 
l in after-tax wealth 
I (A) change in present value 
I (at time O: net present value) 
I (B )  change in after-tax sales value 
I (at time o: after-tax gain 
I if sold) 
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that ( 1 )  and (2) must be treated as 
distinct cases and that (A) and (B) must treated as distinct 
cases . 
My original article analyzes whether the Haig-Simons ideal is 
met when (A) is compared to ( 1 ) . Propositions 5 - 7 state the 
results for (A) versus (2) , ( B) versus ( 1 )  and (B )  versus ( 2 )  
respectively: 
72 . See , Strnad , supra note 9 ,  at 1079 .
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Proposition 5 The traditional income tax does not meet the 
Haig-Simons ideal expressed in terms of comparing net present
value at time o or changes in present value after time o to 
changes in tax world market value . 
Proposition 6 Unless the second view applies , the traditional
income tax does not meet the Haig-Simons ideal expressed in 
terms of comparing after-tax profit if sold at time O or 
changes in after-tax sales value after time o to changes in no
tax world market value . 
Proposition 7 The traditional income tax meets the 
Haig-Simons ideal expressed in terms of comparing after-tax 
profit if sold at time o to changes in tax world market value 
at that time . For times after time o ,  the traditional income 
tax meets the Haig-Simons ideal expressed ' in terms of 
comparing changes in after-tax sales value to changes in tax
world market value . 
I I .  Derivation o f  the Propositions 
Consider the riskless version of the paradigmatic investment 
transaction in my original article .  This involves the owner 
expending X at time O to receive revenues of Y for certain at time 
1 .  Suppose that at time o the investment has a market value of 
X + pt ( o )  so that pt ( o )  is the premium above the cost , X, to the 
owner . In a competitive market , purchase of this investment from 
the owner will be a transaction with zero net present value . If  
the buyer can deduct the portion D of the cost at time O and the 
remaining proportion ( 1  - D) at time 1 ,  then for purchase to have a 
net present value of zero at time O it must be true that : 
- ( 1 - DT) [X + pt ( o ) ) + C l  - DiTlXrt pt col )  + Yil+-rfl = 0 (Al )
But s ince NPVt ( o )  = - ( 1  - DT) X  + [Y ( l  - T) + ( 1  - D) TX] / ( l  + rt) ,
(Al)  implies 
- ( 1  - DT) Pt ( o )  + (l � �i;rtco i  + NPVt ( o )  = 0 (A2) 
Solving for pt ( o )  and multiplying it by (1 - T) yields :
_ t _ t _ C l - D lTrt ( 1  T) P (0 )  - NPV (0) ( 1  ( l  _ T )  + ( l  _ DT) rt ) (A3 ) 
This equation indicates that under the CFIT (D  = 1 )  net present 
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value i s  equal t o  after-tax profit from sale . This establishes 
Proposition 2 at time o .  Whenever D � 1 ,  net present value will 
not equal after-tax sales value , 7 3  This establishes Proposition 4 
at time O .  In addition , even under the second special view a 
change in pt ( o )  will not result in the "Haig-Simons response" of 
NPVt ( o )  changing by ( 1  - T) Pt ( o ) . This establishes Proposition 5 
at time o .  Finally , note that regardless o f  the value o f  D ,  the 
after-tax profit from sale at time O would be ( 1  - T ) Pt ( o ) , exactly 
( 1  - T) times the change in tax world market value of Pt ( o ) . This 
establishes Proposition 7 at time o .  
Equation (27 )  in my original article specifies the relation 
between NPVt ( o )  and NPV ( O ) given that rt = (rho) r is the relation 
between rt , the after-tax riskless rate in the tax world , and r,  
the riskless rate in the no tax world: 
NPVt ( o )  = ( 1  - T) NPV ( O )  - ( 1  - D) TX Crho l r  1 + (rho) r 
+ Y(l - T) r (l  - Crhol ) ( 27 )  ( 1  + ( rho) r) ( 1  + r )  
Substituting this expression for NPVt ( o )  into (A3 ) and simplifying 
yields : 
(1  + r) C l - T)2 
( 1  - T) + ( 1  - DT) ( rho) r NPV ( O )  
+ (1 - T)Xr[ Cl - T) - (1 - OT) (rho) 1 (A4 )( 1  - T) + ( 1  - OT) (rho ) r  
For the CFIT D = 1 ,  and (rho) = 1 when the CFIT applies in a 
non-general-equilibrium setting . But then (A4 ) implies that pt ( o )  
7 3 . Furthermore , when D < 1 ,  net present value exceeds 
after-tax sales value and the owner is better off keeping the 
investment rather than selling it . There is a kind of "lock-in"
effect . Thus , if the traditional income tax involves any cost 
recovery treatment that is less lenient than the CFIT,  net present
value is arguably a more accurate indicator of the change in net 
wealth than after-tax sales value since the owner is likely to keep
the asset . 
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= NPV ( O ) . Thus , the no tax world market value , x + NPV ( O ) , is 
equal to the tax world market value , x + pt ( O ) . This establishes 
Proposition 1 at time o .  When o t l ,  then (rho) = (1 - T) / ( 1 - DT) 
is required for pt ( o ) , the change in tax world market value , to be 
equal to NPV ( O ) , the change in no tax world market value . This 
establishes Proposition 3 at time o .  Furthermore , it will only be 
true that ( 1  - T) Pt ( o )  = ( 1  - T) NPV ( O )  under the second view . 
Therefore , (T) Pt ( o ) , the tax on gain if sold at time o ,  will 
represent a Haig-Simons tax on NPV ( O )  only when the second view 
applies . This establishes Proposition 6 at time o .  
Now consider times after time o .  The cost X i s  sunk and the 
right to the investment is a right to collect time 1 revenues . At 
time t where t > o ,  the seller would realize the after-tax amount 
R (t )  ( 1  - T ) [Vt (t ) - X ( l  - D) ] + X ( l  - 0 )
( 1  - T ) Vt (t) + TX ( l  - 0 )  (AS ) 
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expressed in terms of comparing changes in present value after time o 
to changes in tax world market value , it must be true that PVt (t )  
( 1  - T) Vt (t) plus a constant independent of time . In that case , 
changes in the tax world market value , vt (t ) , result in a 
"Haig-Simons response" of ( 1  - T) Vt (t )  in PVt (t ) . But it is clear 
from equation (A7 )  that this will not be true even under the second 
view . This establishes Proposition S for times after time o .  
Substituting the expression for vt (t )  from (A7 ) into (AS) 
yields : 
R (t )  
= 
PVt (t )  ( 1  �
l
T) �
l �i � ��{;t}t) + �re: ;) Dl '}1--D��J�t��) (AB )
Under the CFIT o = 1 and by equation (AB ) R (t)  = PVt (t ) . In other
words , after-tax sales value equals after-tax present value . This 
establishes Proposition 2 for times after time o .  But when D t 1 
then after-tax sales value will not generally be equal to after-tax 
present value . This establishes Proposition 4 for times after time 
where vt (t )  is the market value of the investment in the tax world o .
at some time t following time o .  Here the seller recove�s X ( l  - D) 
tax free on sale since this is the undeducted portion of the cost 
at time o .  For the transaction to have zero net present value for 
the buyer it must be true that : 






OT) Vt (t )  + ( 1  - Dl TV
t (tl 
1 + rt (t )  1 + rt (t )  = 0 
By equation ( 4 7 )  in my original article,  the after-tax present 
value of the investment at time t is : 
pvt (t )  _ Y ( l  - Tl + ( 1  - Ol TX - l + rt (t )  1 + rt (t )  
From ( 47 )  and (A6 )  it  follows that : 
(A6) 
( 4 7 )  
t t ( 1  + rt (tl l V (t )  = PV (t )  ( 1 - T) + ( 1 - OT) rt (t )  -
XT ( l  - Ol 
( 1  - T) + (1 - OT) rt (t) (A7 )
In order for the traditional income tax to meet the Haig-Simons ideal 
Using equations ( 4 7 )  and ( 4 9 )  from my original article yields 
the following relation between pvt (t )  and PV (t ) , the no tax world 
present value of the investment at time t :  
pvt (t )  = (1  - Tl (1 + r (t) ) PV (t )  1 + (rho) r (t) 
(1 - O )TX + 1 + (rho) r (t)  
terms of vt (t )  Rearranging (A7 )  to express pvt (t )  in 
( rho) r (t)  results in : 
(A9 ) 
using rt (t) = 
pvt (t )  {l  - Dl TX + vt (t) (1 - Tl + (1 - OT) (rhol r(tl (AlO )1 + ( rho) r (t)  1 + (rho) r (t)  
Now from (A9 ) and (AlO)  it follows that the relation between vt (t) 
and PV (t )  is :  
vt (t )  {l - Tl {l  + r(tl l ( 1  - T )  + ( 1  - DT) (rho) r (t) PV (t )
For the CFIT O = 1 ,  and (rho) = 1 when the CFIT applies in a 
(All )  
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non-general-equilibrium setting . But then (All) implies that vt (t) 
= PV (t ) . Thus , the no tax world market value , PV (t ) , is equal to 
the tax world market value , vt (t ) . This establishes Proposition 1
for times after time o. When D � 1 ,  then (rho) = ( 1  - T) / ( l - DT) 
is required for PV (t )  = vt (t )  to be true so that changes in PV (t )  
are equal to changes in vt (t ) . This establis�es Proposition 3 for 
times after time o.
It remains to show that Propositions 6 and 7 are true for times 
after time o .  Substituting the expression for pvt (t )  from (A9 ) into 
(AS) and noting that rt (t )  = ( rho) r (t )  results in : 
R ( t )  C l - T) 2 ( 1 + r Ctl l . ( 1  - T) + ( 1  - DT) ( rho) r (t ) PV (t )  + ( 1  - D) TX (Al2)  
When D � 1 ,  then (rho) = ( 1  - T) / ( l - DT) is required for R (t )  
( 1  - T) PV (t )  + (a constant ) to  be  true . Thus , after-tax sales value 
will respond in a Haig-Simons manner to changes in the no tax world 
market value only when the second view applies . This establishes 
Proposition 6 for times after time o .
From (AS ) and (AlO) it follows that : 
R (t )  = ( 1  - T) Vt (t )  + ( 1  - D) TX (Al3 )  
Regardless of the value of D ,  any change in vt (t )  will result in a 
change exactly ( 1  - T )  as large in R (t ) . As a result ,  for times 
after time o ,  the traditional income tax meets the Haig-Simons ideal 
expressed in terms of comparing changes in after-tax sales value to 
changes in tax world market value . This establishes Proposition 7 
for times after time o .
